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This is first o f two articles that wi l l address mental health issues at work.2 It is written in the 
context of the case3 brought by the European Commission against the U K government alleging 
that the standard of care prescribed by the Health and Safety at W o r k A c t 1974 falls below that 
required by the European Framework Directive on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work.4 
It wil l be argued that such alleged divergences between the U K and Europe are not clear cut, and, 
in the context o f mental health, given the more nebulous nature o f mental i l l health and its causes, 
such divergences might be negligible. 
I. T H E S T R U C T U R E O F H E A L T H A N D S A F E T Y L A W IN T H E W O R K P L A C E 
1.1 Common law liability 
A t common law, injuries to mental health and physical health respectively, have been regarded 
differently.5 W o r k place injury is compensatable (inter alia) under the law of employers' liability, 
1 Reader in Law, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham 
Trent University. 
2 The second, and forthcoming, article will consider the 
treatment of mental health of workers and the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Publication is 
planned for the next issue of the J M H L 
3 Case C~l 27/05. The case is pending before the 
European Court of Justice. It is anticipated it will be 
heard this year. 
4 Directive 89/391/EEC. 
5 See Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 
[1992] 1 AC 310. 
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which is a species of negligence and constrained by the usual limiting factors.6 The structure o f the 
common law consists of an employer's 'personal' duty towards employers. This means that the 
employer cannot avoid responsibility by authorising another party to take on this duty; it is 'non-
delegable'.7 Generally the obligation is to provide competent fellow workers; a safe place of work 
in terms of both premises and equipment; and a safe system of work.8 The standard o f care is that 
of the reasonable employer,9 although there is a form of strict liability in terms o f vicarious 
liability which means that however careful the employer has been, it will be liable for the negligence 
of its employees. 
1.2 The Health and Safety at W o r k A c t 1974 
There are U K statutes which overlay the common law position such as a number of 'independent* 
statutes10 and the Health and Safety at W o r k A c t 1974. The latter was introduced after the Robens 
Committee Report of 1972 which was the result o f concern about the prevalence o f industrial 
injuries and the need to rationalise the former piece-meal approach to health and safety 
legislation.11 Sections 2 - 8 contain the duties of an employer. Section 2 covers the general duty to 
provide safe working conditions for employees, and the qualification that this is subject to what is 
'reasonably practicable'. Section 2 also refers to the more specific areas where the duty arises: 
machinery; handling, storage and transport; information, instruction, training and supervision; 
and the place of work and the working environment (which is particularly applicable to mental 
injury in the form of so-called 'stress claims'). Section 2(2)(e) states that the employer must 
provide: "The provision and maintenance o f a working environment for his employees that is, so 
far as is reasonably practicable, safe, without risks to health, and adequate as regards facilities and 
arrangements for their welfare at work." 
Section 3 imposes a duty in respect o f non-employees, so that the obligation is to conduct the 
undertaking in such a way that non-employees are not exposed to risks to their health and safety. 
Section 7 imposes a duty on employees to look after their own health and safety. The duties do not 
depend upon actual harm, but upon the risk of harm.12 Both physical and mental health are 
covered by the Ac t . 1 3 By virtue o f section 15 of the Act , the Secretary of State is empowered to 
make regulations to deal with specific aspects of health and safety.14 The A c t imposes criminal 
liability only15 but an action for damages w i l l lie for breach o f health and safety regulations made 
pursuant to section 15 unless the regulations exclude liability.16 
6 See White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 
[1999] 2 AC 455. 
7 Wilsons & Clyde Coal v English [1938] AC 57. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Wilson v Tyneside Window Cleaning Co [1958] 2 Q B 
110. 
10 For example, generally applicable statutes such as The 
Employers' Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 
(this provides for employers' liability in respect of 
defective equipment regardless of the employer's own 
reasonable care) and the Employers' Liability 
(Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969. There are also a 
number of specialist statutes such as the Mines and 
Quarries Act 1954. 
11 The Committee on Safety and Health at Work 1970-72 
(Cmnd 5034) (The Robens Committee). 
12 Rv Board of Trustees of the Science Museum [1993] 3 
All ER 853. 
13 Section 47(6). 
14 e.g. The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health 
Regulations 1988 SI 1988/1657. 
15 Section 47(l)(a) states there is no civil liability; Section 
33 imposes criminal penalties 
16 Section 47(2). 
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1.3 The European Framework Directive 
Article 137 (formerly Article 118) of the Treaty o f Rome (as amended) states that the Community 
shall support the activities o f Member States to protect workers' health and safety. Emanating 
from this is the general directive on health and safety known as the European Framework 
Directive.17 In many ways the Directive reflects the employer's non-delegable common law personal 
obligation in as much as the employer cannot avoid the obligation by appointing external persons 
to carry out the obligation to 'ensure the safety and health of workers' (Article 5). The Directive 
applies to a wider category of 'workers' than those who satisfy the definition of 'employee' (Article 
3). The main obligations are as follows: 
Article 6 
1. W i t h i n the context o f his responsibilities, the employer shall take the measures 
necessary for the safety and health protection of workers, including the prevention o f 
occupational risks and provision of information and training, as well as provision of the 
necessary organization and means 
2. The employer shall implement the measures on the basis of the following general 
principles of prevention: 
(a) avoiding risks; 
(b) evaluating the risks which cannot be avoided; 
(c) combating the risk at source; 
(d) adapting the work to the individual, especially as regards the design of work places, the 
choice of work equipment and the choice o f working and work places, the choice o f work 
equipment and the choice of working and production methods, with a view, in particular, 
to alleviating monotonous work and work at a predetermined work-rate and to reducing 
their effect on health; 
(e) adapting to technical progress; 
(f) replacing the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less dangerous; 
(g) developing a coherent overall prevention policy which covers technology, organization 
of work, working conditions, social relationships and the influence o f factors related to 
the working environment; 
(h) giving collective protective measures priority over individual protective measures; 
(i) giving appropriate instructions to workers; 
Article 7 states that the employer must provide protective and preventive services through the 
appointment of competent persons. If there are no competent persons within the organization, the 
employer must enlist competent external services or persons, and these persons must have the 
necessary capabilities and the necessary means to provide such services. Article 9 requires the 
employer to assess, respond to, and monitor the response to risks; including reporting of accidents. 
Workers must be provided with information about safety and health risks and the required 
17 89/391/EEC. 
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protective and preventive measures (Article 10). The employer must provide for consultation with 
and participation by workers (Article 11) and provide adequate safety training to workers (Article 
12). The Directive also imposes obligations on workers such as making proper use of equipment 
and protective clothing and informing employers of health and safety risks (Article 13). There are 
a number of more specific 'daughter' Directives18 emanating from the Framework Directive which 
have been absorbed into U K law via regulations. 
The European standard is therefore that o f the competent person, unconstrained by consideration 
of cost, time or inconvenience. 
1.4 Regulations 
The Framework Directive was to be transposed into domestic law by 31 December 1992. M u c h o f 
the content was already in force by virtue o f the Health and Safety at Work A c t 1974. However, 
the Management o f Health and Safety at W o r k Regulations were issued in 1992 to deal with risk 
assessments. They were reissued in 1999, slightly revised, and with the addition o f reference to the 
Directive's 'principles of prevention'.19 These Regulations require employers to carry out risk 
assessments and effectively to carry out the obligations outlined above as stated in the Framework 
Directive.20 C iv i l liability for breach o f these regulations is specifically excluded.21 
1.5 The link between U K statute and private law actions and the enforcement of the 
European Directive 
It is trite law to say that not all statutory obligations give rise to private law actions. A s we have 
seen, under section 47(l)(a) the Health and Safety at W o r k A c t there can be no reliance on the A c t 
in bringing a civil claim in respect of sections 2 - 8 o f the A c t . However, a civil claim can be 
brought in respect of failure to comply with regulations made under the Ac t . 2 2 In Bailey v 
Command Security Services Ltd 2 3 a failure to carry out a proper risk assessment in breach of the 
Management o f Health and Safety at W o r k Regulations 1992 which do not give rise to civil 
liability, was, nevertheless, used to show that there had been common law negligence. In 
consequence even if there is no breach o f statutory duty simply because the common law 
requirements have not been satisfied, civil liability can still arise through the imposition of the 
same standard of care as required by the relevant statutory provisions. 
European Directives are instructions to member states to implement terms o f the European Treaty, 
but the precise way in which states choose to implement a Directive is left to the state concerned.24 
A n individual in a member state can rely directly on a Directive if it is sufficiently clear and 
unconditional.25 This direct effect is 'vertical' only i.e. it can only be enforced against the state or 
18 Directives 89/654; Directive 89/655; Directive 89/656; 
Directive 90/269; Dirctive 90/270; Directive 90/394. 
19 Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 
1999, SI 1999/3242. 
20 Regulations made under the daughter Directives are: the 
Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 
1992; the Provision and Use of Work Equipment 
Regulations 1992; the Personal protective Equipment at 
Work Regulations 1992; the Health and Safety (Display 
Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992; the Manual 
Handling Operations Regulations 1992 (these all make 
up what is often referred to as the 'six pack'). 
56 
21 Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 
1999, Reg 22(1). 
22 Section 47(2). 
23 [2001] WL 1535385. 
24 Article 249 (3) EC. 
25 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. In theory 
the member state should have transposed the Directive 
into national law so that reliance on the Directive itself 
should be unnecessary, but it might not have been 
transposed, or only partially or inadequately transposed. 
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an emanation of the state that provides a public service.26 However, Directives can also have 
indirect effect inasmuch as they can be used by national courts as an aid to interpretation of the 
relevant national law, and even legislation not specifically enacted to comply with European law.27 
Indirect effect means that cases would not be restricted to action against state enterprises.28 This 
means that it would be possible for the U K health and safety regulatory framework to be 
interpreted in the light o f the Framework Directive or for the Directive to be relied upon directly 
against a public service employer. It has been argued that some o f the provisions o f the Directive 
are sufficiently precise to be directly enforceable, such as a failure to take into consideration a 
worker's capabilities, to adapt work to an individual worker, or adequately to train a worker 
(Articles 6(2)(d), and A r t i c l e d ) . 2 9 
There is a requirement under European law that there be an effective remedy for breach of 
European law.30 The Health and Safety at W o r k A c t and the 1999 Regulations do not admit of a 
civil remedy. Whi l s t many physical injuries are covered by the 'six pack' Regulations31 which do 
give rise to a civil law right, the situation with regard to mental injuries, as we wi l l see, is uncertain, 
and employees have to rely upon the common law, and in particular, on the principles in Sutherland 
v Hatton^ (discussed below). There is no divergence from Europe here as long as one or more o f 
three situations pertains (discussed below): the Framework Directive does not apply to mental 
injury; it applies in a different way so as not to demand the standard o f the competent person; 
there is little difference between U K standards and the European standard. 
It must be said, however, that if European law treats mental injuries in the same way as physical 
injuries, then the question arises as to whether there is an effective remedy when the 'reasonably 
practicable* test is applied. In Cross v Highlands & Islands Enterprise the Scottish Outer House held 
that the Framework Directive is concerned with general health and safety improvement and that 
there was no intention to confer an individual (private law) right of action in respect o f any 
breaches.33 W e wi l l re-visit this case later on in this article. 
2. M E N T A L H E A L T H IN T H E W O R K P L A C E 
2.1 The common law - negligence liability 
For the purposes o f employment law, injuries to mental health can be divided into two categories: 
those induced by trauma and those induced by the wider working environment, but more 
26 Marshall v Southampton and South West Area Health 
Authority (No 1) [1986] ECR 723; Foster v British Qas 
pic and others [1990] ECR 1-3313; Doughty v Rolls 
Royce pic [1992] 1 C M L R 1045. 
27 See Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhien-
Westfalen [1984] ECR 1337 and Marleasing SA v La 
Commercial Internacional de Alimentation [1990] 
ECR 1-4135. Note however, Hawkes v London Borough 
of Southwark (1998 20 February unreported) where, in 
the context of the Manual Handling Operations 
Regulations 1992, the Court of Appeal interpreted 
'reasonably practicable' in accordance with pre-
European Community law. 
28 Webb v EMO Air Cargo (K) Ltd (No 2) [1995] 4 All 
ER 577. 
29 } Hendy & M Ford Munkman on Employer's Liability 
13th Edition (London, Butterworths, 2001) p 299. 
30 Article 249 EC. 
31 These are Regulations made under the daughter 
Directives are: the Workplace (Health, Safety and 
Welfare) Regulations 1992; the Provision and Use of 
Work Equipment Regulations 1992; the Personal 
protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992; the 
Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) 
Regulations 1992; the Manual Handling Operations 
Regulations 1992 (these all make up what is often 
referred to as the 'six pack'). 
32 [2002] WL 45314. 
33 [2001] SLT 1060 at 1088. 
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commonly described as 'stress' claims. Trauma-induced injuries are less problematic at common 
law (but not necessarily fair or coherent) because of the limiting factors set down in non-
employment tort law.34 The key case in the employment context is White v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police.35 For our purposes, the main element of the decision was whether mental injury 
caused by employers' liability can be treated differently from cases of ordinary negligence. The 
Court of Appeal 3 6 had held that the distinction between primary and secondary victims37 did not 
apply when there is a pre-existing duty of care as in the case of the employer/employee 
relationship. The House of Lords disagreed; thus, if the employee is not a primary victim s/he must 
be a secondary victim and in consequence must have a close tie o f love and affection with a 
primary victim, a condition that would not be satisfied simply by being work colleagues. 
The 'stress' cases present a much more open-ended picture at common law. The first case was Fetch 
v Commissioner Customs & Excise38 and, although the claimant was unsuccessful, the general 
foreseeability test applied therein was applied in Walker v Northumberland County Council.39 M r 
Walker suffered a nervous breakdown following a significant increase in his workload about which 
he had complained. W h e n he returned to work after taking a period of sick leave caused by the 
stress of his work, there had been no steps taken to alleviate his workload and he suffered a relapse 
and took ill-health retirement. The judge held that the first breakdown was unforeseeable for two 
reasons. First, the employing authority had no previous experience of workers becoming i l l 
through overwork. Secondly, there was nothing in the personality of M r Walker to alert them to 
the possibility o f this happening to h im. The second breakdown was, for fairly obvious reasons, 
held to be foreseeable and M r Walker was successful. 
Since Walker, stress cases have been examined by the higher courts. In Sutherland v Hatton40 a set 
of general principles were set out by the Cour t of Appeal . The case concerned a number of 
conjoined appeals, and only one claimant succeeded. One o f the unsuccessful claimants appealed 
to the House of Lords where his appeal was upheld (Barber v Somerset County Council41). However, 
the House of Lords endorsed the main principles set out by the Court of Appeal .4 2 These can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. For the purposes o f employers' liability there is a difference between physical and mental injury, 
as risk of mental injury occurring depends upon differences in approaches to, and prioritising of, 
work (paras 5 and 23). 
2. Foreseeability is the gateway to recovery as without this there is no breach of duty even if 
occupational stress has caused the mental injury (paras 23 and 24). 
3. Facts relevant to foreseeability include the nature and extent of the work done by the employee 
34 Principally in the House of Lords decisions of Alcock v 
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 
310 and Page v Smith [1995] 2 WLR 644. 
35 [1999] 2 AC 455. 
36 Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 
[1997] 1 All ER 540. 
37 Primary victims are those who are either injured or 
foreseeably at risk of being injured or reasonably believe 
themselves to be (Page v Smith [1995] 2 WLR 644) and 
secondary victims are present at the traumatic event or 
its immediate aftermath and have a close tie of love and 
affection with one or more primary victims (Alcock v 
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 
310). 
38 [1993] 1CR 789. 
39 [1995] 1AIIER737. 
40 [2002] WL 45314. This case was considered in detail 
by Edward Myers in 'Claiming Damages for Work Place 
Stress' in JMHL December 2002, pp 283 - 292. 
41 [2004] 1 WLR 1089. 
42 The basis of the majority decision to uphold the appeal 
was that the Court of Appeal had insufficient reason to 
set aside the trial judge's findings. 
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and overt signs from the employee or complaints or warnings from others. These indications must 
be plain to a reasonable employer (para 5). 
4. There is no intrinsically stressful work, and employers are entitled to assume that the employee 
can withstand the normal pressures of the job, unless they know of some particular problem or 
vulnerability (para 29). 
5. The employer can only take steps that are 'reasonable' (defined by the usual negligence standard 
of care considerations such as the magnitude of the risk of harm occurring, the gravity of the harm 
and the costs and practicability of preventing it). These steps wil l depend on the employer's 
undertaking, including its size, resources and demands that would be made on other employees 
(paras 32 and 33). 
6. If the only reasonable step that can be taken is dismissal, the employer wi l l not be in breach if 
he allows a willing employee to stay in the job (para 34). 
7. A n employer who offers a confidential advice service, with referral to counselling or treatment 
services, is unlikely to be found in breach of duty (paras 17 and 33). 
A related and important question concerns how far an employee can consent to pressure at work. 
In Smith v Ba/cer43 the House of Lords rejected the argument that an employee could assume the 
risk of the employer's negligence. In other words, it is no defence if the risk should reasonably be 
guarded against. Johnstone v Bloomsbury44 concerned the excessive hours worked by a junior doctor, 
which were covered by an express term in the contract. The employee's claim was based upon the 
implied contractual term that an employer wi l l care for its employees' health and safety, and that 
this should override any conflicting express term. The case was only before the Cour t of Appeal 
on an interlocutory application and the issue was never fully litigated. By a majority, the court held 
that in principle it was possible to argue that an employee was not always bound by the express 
terms in his employment contract, but it turned on the judgment of Lord Browne-Wilkinson who 
made that finding on the basis of the particular wording of the contract, which gave a certain 
amount of discretion to the employer, and that discretion would have to be exercised reasonably 
in the light of the implied term. The implication is that if the term had not been open to use of 
discretion then the majority decision would have endorsed the primacy of the express term. This 
emphasises the unsatisfactory relationship between duties under contractual terms and tort as it is 
well established that the defence of volenti non fit injuria45 - in other words, the plaintiff has 
voluntarily assumed the risk of injury, is rarely applicable in employers' liability cases of 
negligence46 and is never available as a defence in actions for breach of statutory duty.47 It is highly 
likely that the contractual approach conflicts with more stringent statutory standards, both U K and 
European, because they are about making workplaces safe and not about allowing workers to agree 
to work in unsafe conditions. Commendable as this may be, it is by no means clear what is meant 
by 'unsafe' in the context o f mental health. Furthermore, European law itself provides for workers 
to consent to working conditions that might be less than optimal.48 
43 [1891 ] AC 325. 47 Wheeler v New Merton Boardmills Ltd [1933] 2 KB 
44 [1991] 2 All ER 293. 669-
45 In other words, the defence that the plaintiff has 48 Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC, in Article 17, 
voluntarily assumed the risk of injury. **™ l t t certain derogations from e.g. Article 6 which sets 
46 Bowater v Rowley Regis Corporation [1944] KB 476. a maximum working week of 48 hours. 
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3. THE CHALLENGE FROM EUROPE 
3.1 'Reasonably practicable' 
The essence of the challenge from the European Commission is that section 2(1) of the 1974 A c t 
which states that it is the duty of every employer to ensure the health, safety and welfare of all his 
employees at work so far as is 'reasonably practicable' is incompatible with the Directive. There is 
liability under the Directive for all aspects of health and safety and the only exception is under 
Article 5(4) which states: "This Directive shall not restrict the option of Member States to provide 
for the exclusion or the limitation of employers' responsibility where occurrences are due to 
unusual and unforeseeable circumstances beyond the employers' control, or to exceptional events, 
the consequences o f which could not have been avoided despite the exercise o f all due care". The 
Commission's view is that the 'reasonably practicable' qualification in U K legislation does not fit 
in to this exclusion.49 N o doubt its argument wil l be that it effectively permits an employer to 
escape responsibility if he can prove that the sacrifice involved in taking further measures, whether 
in money, time or trouble, is excessive in some way, and not just in the very exceptional situations 
envisaged by Art icle 5(4). 
First, one needs to look at what 'reasonably practicable' means.50 'Practicable' means that the 
preventative measures must be possible in the light of current knowledge and invention.51 It is a 
very stringent test, therefore, and means that the employer must take all available steps without 
regard to cost, time and inconvenience. It is the qualification made by the word 'reasonably' that 
potentially conflicts with the standard envisaged by the Directive. This implies that, although a 
measure might be possible, it is not reasonable to expect an employer to implement such a measure 
in terms of cost (either of materials or time or other forms of expense such as loss of production). 
The phrase 'reasonably practicable' was examined by the Cour t of Appeal in Edwards v National 
Coal Board and it is clear that it does not mean the same as 'the employer took all reasonable 
care.'53 In Edwards it was stated: 
"Reasonably practicable" is a narrower term than "physically possible", and seems to me to imply 
that a computation must be made by the owner in which the quantum of risk is placed on one 
scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, 
time or trouble) is placed in the other, and that, if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion 
between them — the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice - the defendants discharge 
the onus on them.54 
There has been some doubt as to whether the Edwards gross disproportion test was endorsed by 
the House of Lords in Marshall v Qotham Co Ltd55 but the leading authority on employers' liability 
cogently argues that it was so endorsed.56 In Taylor v City of Qlasgow it was said that the difference 
between reasonable practicability and the common law duty o f care is that in the former case, 
49 Case C-127/05 (pleas in law and main arguments), risk of death or serious injury: Read v Lyons [194-7] AC 
50 The qualification applies in other jurisdictions too, see l56 at 173> Wri8ht v E>unlop Rubber Co & ICl Ltd 
for example Australia's Occupational Health and (1972) 13 KIR 255. 
Safety and Welfare Regulations 1995. 54 Op cit at 712. 
51 Schwalb v Fass (H) & Son [1946] 175 L T 345. 55 [1954] AC 360 
52 [1949] 1 KB 704, CA. 56 See ] Hendy and M Ford Munkman on Employer's 
53 However the standard may be the same when there is a Liability 13th Edition (London Butterworths 2001) p 
249. 
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precautions must be taken to make a workplace safe as opposed to guard against reasonably 
foreseeable risks.5 ' 
The U K courts have taken a fairly broad brush approach to risk assessment in the case of physical 
injuries. In Furness v Midland Bank pic58 the claimant appealed against the dismissal o f her claim 
brought under the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations59 for damages for personal 
injuries arising from an accident at work in which she had slipped on water on an internal flight of 
stairs and fallen. The allegation was that the employer had shown no evidence o f having a system 
for dealing with spillages and, as such, had failed in its statutory duty to take reasonable 
precautions to keep the stairs free from water. Her appeal was dismissed on the basis that, whilst it 
would have been reasonably practicable for the employer to have issued its employees with an 
instruction to watch out for water spillages, the infrequency of spillages and the fact that the 
premises were used by employees only, meant its failure to do so did not put it in breach of Reg. 
12(3). This can be contrasted with Ward v Tesco Stores60 where the risk of spillage was significant 
and obvious. Furthermore, U K cases have treated regulations made pursuant to the Directive such 
as the Manual Handling Operations Regulations61 as imposing a general duty only. For example, in 
Taylor v City of Qlasgow it was said: "[The Framework Directive] is not expressed with reference to 
an individual task. The obligation is one intended to be carried out in respect o f the employer's 
undertaking generally and in advance o f any particular operation."62 In a very helpful review of 
the area63 Hendy has concluded that the standard of the 'reasonably practicable' test is below that 
of the European Directive, but, given the gross disproportionality test set out in Edwards it is not 
a crude cost/benefit standard.64 
However, if we are persuaded by the two statements in Taylor v City of Qlasgow that first, there is 
an obligation under the reasonably practicable test to make the workplace 'safe', but secondly, 
under the European Directive, this relates to the generality of the employer's undertaking or parts 
of the undertaking rather than each individual task, then the standard can, arguably, be regarded 
as very similar. Further, it is arguable that the Directive itself envisages a more pragmatic approach 
as one of the principles o f prevention, states that measures should be implemented to replace the 
dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less dangerous (Article 6(2)(f); emphasis added). 
3.2 The Directive and mental health 
In Cross v Highlands and Islands Enterprise65 the judge concluded that the Directive was not intended 
to apply to mental health. In support o f this, he referred to the European Commission's General 
Framework for Ac t i on in the Field of Safety, Hygiene and Health at Work 6 6 and its opening 
paragraph which stated that: "The objective o f the Commission's policy in the field o f safety and 
] Hendy, "Industrial Accident Claims: Reasonable 
Practicability" [2001] JP1L Issue 3, 209. 
The cost/benefit test referred to is often described as the 
'Learned Hand' test as set out by Hand J in the case of 
United States v Carroll Towing Co (1947) 159 F 2ds 
169. It does not incorporate the concept of 
proportionality in terms of risk and preventative 
measures, nor the need for a balancing exercise between 
the size of the risk and the gravity of the likely damage. 
[2001] SLT 1060. 
1994-2000 (COM (93)560). 
61 
57 [2002] SC 364, at 378. 63 
58 [2000] Wl 1720378. 
59 SI 1992/3004. 64 
60 [1976] 1 WLR810. 
61 SI 1992/2793. 
62 [2002] SC 363 at 374. See also Koonul v Thameslink 
Healthcare Services [2000] PIQR P123 where the 
generality of the risk assessment exercises was stressed, 
as opposed to looking at each and every task, and Postle 65 
v Norfolk and Norwich NHS Healthcare Trust [2000]
 6 6 
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health at work over the last thirty years has been to reduce to a minimum both work accidents and 
occupational diseases".67 The first reference to 'stress' was in a resolution of the European 
Parliament of 6 M a y 1994 which urged the Commission to investigate, as a priority, measures in 
the field of stress, both physical and mental. In Cross, the judge concluded that the reference to 
'accidents' and 'diseases' could not include mental health problems, and that this was borne out 
by the resolution o f the European Parliament which post-dated the Directive. However, the Object 
o f the Directive states that ..."it contains general principles concerning the prevention of 
occupational risks...." (Article 1) and this expression is repeated at various points throughout, so 
arguably the wording of the Directive itself is wide enough to cover mental health. In addition, 
Article 6(2)(g) refers to the development of an overall prevention policy which covers (inter alia) 
"social relationships and the influence of factors related to the working environment", which 
suggests that regard should be had to risks over and above those of a physical nature. A similar 
argument can be made in respect of Article 6(2)(d) which requires adaptation of work to the 
individual " in particular, to alleviating monotonous work" which suggests that there is more than 
the physical element of work under consideration. The fact that 'stress' can cause physical injury 
is another factor that supports the view that a demarcation between the two aspects o f injury is 
not appropriate.68 Furthermore, an argument can be made that, as the Directive was not intended 
to replace any domestic law if that law was more generous,69 and as the Health and Safety at W o r k 
A c t specifically applies to both physical and mental health, then this should be read in conjunction 
with the Directive so that mental health is within its ambit. Indeed, it is arguable that the Health 
and Safety Executive has implicitly endorsed this, for example by issuing an improvement notice 
against the West Dorset General Hospitals N H S Trust following stress-related claims by staff.70 
A t the time of both the Robens Report in 1972 and the European Directive in 1989 the risk to 
health in the workplace would have been considered primarily in terms o f heavy industry and 
manufacturing. Since then, however, there have been significant changes. There has been a move 
away from manufacturing towards service industries and the huge increase in the use of 
computers.71 There has also been a large increase in the number of small employers72 and an 
increase in atypical work patterns such as homeworkers.73 Privatisation has also affected the scale 
of undertakings. Thus the changes since 1990 make the large scale health and safety issues and 
solutions which informed this legislation increasingly inappropriate, whilst at the same time the 
new types o f work arguably bring with them new forms o f i l l health.74 The Commission 
Communication o f 11 M a r c h 2002 highlights the need for legislation to adapt in a number of areas 
including the prevention o f social and emotional problems (stress, harassment at work, depression, 
anxiety and addiction). It is clear that future European health and safety legislation wi l l encompass 
67 [2001] SLT 1060 at 1087. 71 
68 See the link between work related upper limb disorder 
and psychological factors, for example, S Tyrer, 
Editorial, Journal of Psychosomatic Research (1994) 72 
Vol 38 No 6, p 493. 
69 Article 1(3), and see Stark v Post Office [2000] 1CR 73 
1013. 
70 http://www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndQuidance/Human 74 
ResourcesAndTraining/ModelEmployer/Occupational 
Health/OccupationalHealthArticle/fs/en?CONTENT 
JD=4063966&chk=ueKTh}%2B 
J McClean et al "Till Death Do Us Part: Changing 
work relationships in the 1990s" (1994) 1 Trends in 
Organizational Behaviour 111-136. 
Health and Safety Executive Health and Safety in 
Small Firms (HMSO, London 1995). 
S Fredman "Labour Law in Flux: The Changing 
Composition of the Workforce" [1997] Vol 26 337. 
Apart from mental health risks there have been 
ergonomic changes such as the prolonged use of 
telephones and computer screens which can adversely 
affect physical health, see Alexander v Midland Bank 
(1999 27 July, unreported). 
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mental health.0 Future legislation wi l l therefore explicitly refer to mental health and the same 
issues wil l arise with regard to the standard of care imposed. 
4. M E N T A L H E A L T H U N D E R A E U R O P E A N R E G I M E - W H A T S T A N D A R D 
O F CARE? 
4.1 The reasonable employer under common law 
The standard is that as outlined under the Sutherland v Hatton principles. Is it possible to argue that 
the differences between physical and mental health mean that, effectively statutory liability should 
not demand a higher standard than this? There are two potential key differences between physical 
and mental injury. First, the risk of mental injury depends upon the psychological differences 
between individual workers. Al though there can be some deviation in terms o f physical 
resilience,76 generally speaking it is possible to point to fairly standard risks of someone being 
physically injured. It might be thought at first glance that cases such as Paris v Stepney11 do not 
support this view; on the contrary, the physical disability was obvious to the employer. The other 
important plank of the reasonable employer test is that much of the onus falls on the employee to 
alert the employer to the risk to his or her mental health. Although the Court of Appeal regarded 
the nature and extent of the work done as relevant to the foreseeability of injury, the other key 
factor was that there should be clear indications of risk from the employee, and, further, it was 
stated that a reasonable employer is entitled to assume that the employee can withstand the normal 
pressures of the job unless he knows of some particular problem or vulnerability. This does not give the 
employer carte blanche to overload an employee with work; if this happens then the employee 
does not have to show any special vulnerability. However, if the workload is 'normal' then the onus 
falls on the employee to demonstrate this vulnerability. A 'normal' workload should be able to be 
established by fairly objective means, albeit that there would have to be job-specific (as opposed to 
employee-specific) criteria employed. It is instructive that of the four appeals heard by the Cour t 
of Appeal in Sutherland v Hatton the only one that succeeded was the case of an administrator who, 
it was shown, had been required to work grossly excessive hours over the 37 hours per week 
required by her contract of employment.78 There are other objective markers that can be used to 
measure the risk o f stress-related injury, such as evidence of workers not taking meal breaks, and 
explicit changes in job content, management structures and methods of work ing / 9 
However, we need to contemplate the possibility that, either we accommodate the argument that 
the Framework Directive applies to mental health, or a new European Directive is enacted in 
accordance with the Community strategy on health and safety at work.80 In either case we have to 
ascertain whether European standards wi l l be higher than those under U K law. If the U K loses the 
case currently brought by the Commission, the reasonable practicability test wi l l be replaced by the 
75 Community strategy on health and safety at work injury to his good eye. 
(2002-2006) (COM(2002) 118).
 78 {2002] WL 45314, para 61. 
76 The 'egg shell skull' is well-recognised, but there has to
 79 Vnder Qresswell v Inland Revenue [1984] 2 All ER 
be foreseeability of some injury even if the extent of it is
 7U an ^ p / ^ is u r u f e r a duty to adapt to new 
unforeseen (Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92; Hewett v methods of working but adequate training must be 
Alf Brown's Transport Ltd [1992] ICR 530), given. 
77 [1951] AC 367: there was a duty to provide goggles to a
 80 Community strategy on health and safety at work 
one-eyed worker because of the gravity of a potential (2002-2006) (COM(2002) 118). 
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competent person standard. If not, then it is probably safe to assume that the standard would not 
fall below reasonable practicability. 
Although the common law standard implies risk assessment, it is in the statutory provisions that 
it becomes explicit and requires the workplace to be made safe. However, it is arguable that the less 
demanding common law standard is appropriate in the context of mental health, if only because 
it wil l be less clear as to precisely what the employer must do to prevent mental health problems 
developing as a result o f the working environment i.e. because of the variability o f employees' 
responses to stress. O n this test the courts might well stress foreseeability o f injury (even though 
we are not applying the negligence test). In any event, foreseeability has a particular pertinence to 
the reasonably practicable test. 
4,2, Menta l health and the 'reasonably practicable' test 
A s we have seen, this allows an employer to argue that preventative measures must not be grossly 
disproportionate to the risk of, and gravity of, the harm concerned. H o w much higher is this 
standard than that of the reasonable employer? The key word is 'grossly'. Preventative measures in 
mental health are more likely to be about job training, reporting opportunities (effectively 
incorporated into employment law by the statutory requirement to have a grievance procedure 
policy81) and, i f there is some indication of a potential problem thereafter, appropriate monitoring. 
These are not likely to be onerous. Cases have succeeded under the 'reasonable employer' test on 
the basis that employees who have been off sick with stress-related illness did not have their 
situation effectively managed thereafter82 or where some fairly simple instructions would have 
removed some key stressors from the employee.83 It might be argued that the 'management' of 
such a case could be onerous if it required the employer to take on extra staff. This might be 
regarded as grossly disproportionate as long as the job the employee was doing did not impose 
excessive work demands. 
Arguably employers should have nothing to fear from the imposition of higher standards because 
these standards do not require employers to continue to employ workers who are not sufficiently 
robust to carry out the essentials of the jobs concerned. Certainly the common law acknowledges 
this84 as does the law o f unfair dismissal.85 
The approach o f the U K courts to generalised risk assessment would not require risk assessment 
of individuals' approaches to their work to be part of any assessment.86 The improvement notice 
issued to West Dorset General Hospitals N H S Trust by the Health and Safety Executive was 
because it d id not have a work related stress policy or a risk assessment of work related stressors 
83 Rowntree v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
[2001] WL 1346941. 
84 Sutherland v Hatton 2002] WL 45314, para 34. 
85 Dismissal for lack of capability is a potentially fair 
dismissal under setion 98(2)(a) Employment Rights Act 
1996. 
86 See above, for example, the case of Taylor v City of 
Qlasgow [2002] SC 364. 
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82 See Unwin v West Sussex County Council [2001] WL 
825227; Witham v Hastings & Rother NHS Trust 
[2001] WL 1346938; Young v The Post Office [2002] 
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and not because of individual cases.87 Where gross disproportion might arise is in the provision 
of in-house counselling services,88 particularly as such services are available externally and a small 
employer could use these if necessary. 
4.3 Menta l health and the 'competent person' test 
A s we have seen, the European 'competent person' is someone unconstrained by consideration o f 
cost, time or inconvenience. If this is the relevant test then it might be useful to consider whether 
some of the provisions of the Framework Directive might have direct or indirect effect in a mental 
health context. Hendy and Ford have argued that Art icle 6(2)(d) of the Directive is sufficiently 
precise to be directly enforceable89. It is arguable however that this only applies to physical injury. 
Article 6(2)(d) states that one of the principles of prevention is for employers to adapt work to the 
individual. Not only is this not precise, but in the mental health context it could be said that it is 
impracticable to do this, not reasonably impracticable. The advantage of the above argument that 
practicability rather than reasonable practicability is key, is that the European standard o f the 
competent person wil l be much easier to satisfy. If it is impracticable then it is not within the scope 
of the competent person's ability. Similarly Art icle 6(2)(g), which states that employers should 
develop a coherent overall prevention policy covering technology, organization of work, working 
conditions, social relationships and the influence of factors related to the working environment, is 
too vague to be enforceable, and gives rise to the same problems as Article (2)(d). 
Unlike the case of physical health, therefore, preventative measures in the case o f mental health, 
wil l usually be of a general nature only, such as risk assessments and the monitoring o f those 
known to be at risk. A future European Directive on mental health in the workplace might be more 
precise and informative, although arguably the nature of mental health and workplace 'stress' 
might mean that, as at present, the imposition of 'higher standards' results in a situation where the 
employer who implements reasonably practicable measures, and the competent person, are the 
same characters in the context of mental injury because they are both constrained by individual 
psychologies and therefore by what is practicable. 
87 http://www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndQuidance/Human 88 Sutherland v Hatton made it clear that, at common law, 
ResourcesAndTraining/ModelEmployer/Occupational there was no obligation to provide such services, [2002] 
Health/OccupationalHealthArticle/fs/en?CO'NTENT WL 45314, paras 17 and 33. 
JD=4063966&chk=ueKTN%2B
 89 Qpdt 
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Casenotes 
Executive Action and Convention Compliance? A Risk 
Unrecognised by the House 
Kris Qledhill1 
R (MH) v (1) Secretary of State for Health (2) Mental Health Review Tribunal 
House of Lords, 20 October 2005 
[2005] U K H L 60, [2005] Mental Health Law Reports 302 
The House o f Lords ' interest in the impact of the Human Rights A c t 1998 on mental health 
matters, evidenced by the number of cases it has heard2, has continued with the case of M H . The 
two central issues arising were: 
1. Whether automatic reviews of the lawfulness of detention by a court (in practice the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal) are required in relation to s2 detentions where the patient lacks capacity 
to apply for a Tribunal . 
2. Whether a review is required pending the outcome o f an application to displace a nearest 
relative (which extends the period of the s2 detention). 
The House, in a judgment given by Baroness Hale, held that the statutory scheme was compatible 
with the requirements of the Convention, and in so doing overturned two declarations of 
incompatibility granted by the Court of Appeal, and restored the first instance decision of Silber J. 
Facts 
M H , an adult wi th severe learning disabilities, had lived with her mother, who, it was said, refused 
assistance from the authorities which might have been to M H ' s benefit. O n 31 January 2003, 
following concerns about M H ' s behaviour, which was said to be escalating, and her mother's 
Barrister; p/t legal member of the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal; Editor of the Mental Health Law 
Reports. 
R (B) v Ashworth Hospital Authority [2005] Mental 
Health Law Reports 47; R (IH) v Nottinghamshire 
Healthcare NHS Trust [2004] Mental Health Law 
Reports 51; R (Mun]ax) v Mersey Care NHS Trust 
[2005] Mental Health Law Reports 276; R v (1) Tower 
Hamlets Health Care NHS Trust and (2) Snazell ex p 
Von Brandenburg [2004] Mental Health Law Reports 
44; Ward v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
and another [2005] Mental Health Law Reports 128; 
see also Anderson, Doherty and Reid v The Scottish 
Ministers and the Advocate-Qeneral for Scotland 
[2001] Mental Health Law Report 192 (Privy Council 
- considering the Mental Health (Public Safety and 
Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999), and cases relating to 
criminal matters, R v Antoine [2000] Mental Health 
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